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Ten years ago, Alain Touraine famously defined culture as the new paradigm for understanding 
today’s world. Five years before, Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington had edited 
their volume under the heading “Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress”. 
Arguably, in the 21
st
 century the study of culture represents an emerging and expanding field, 
dealing with the central challenges of contemporary society. Because the abstract paradigm of 
culture seems to be the motor of social change, the study of culture has been increasingly 
showing its multidimensional relevance at the interface of smart development and critical 
inquiry. Old, new and renewed cultural practices ask for innovative theories and for advanced 
research methods. In addition, new approaches such as arts based research, connectivism or  the 
examination of big data challenge the hereto overwhelmingly interpretative humanist scholarly 
practice. For many academics, trained in the traditional humanities disciplines (from art history 
to literature or philosophy), the study of culture, perhaps a paradigm that is none, continues to 
bring added complexity and anxiety. How does culture matter in today’s world? How does 
culture relate to globalization?  How does cultural change shape our mind? Which possible 
worlds does contemporary culture allow for? In which ways do culture, conflict, citizenship and 
sovereignty correlate? And, finally, how does the study of culture challenge the critical 
scholarly endeavor of the humanities? The CECC conference “Matters of Culture” discussed the 
state of the art of this debate and has acted as a gateway to future research.   
The conference was organized in three sessions aimed at specifically discussing the following 
issues: 
1) Cultural theory with Geoffrey Galt Harpham and Ansgar Nünning, Moderation:  Luísa 
Leal Faria 
2) Culture, conflict and globalization with Paulo Medeiros and Isabel Capeloa Gil; 
Moderation: Alexandra Lopes  
3) Culture and cognition with Vera Nünning,  Gerhard Lauer and Peter Hanenberg; 
Moderation:  Ana Margarida Abrantes 
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Geoffrey Galt Harpham: 




1. The academic area most deeply invested in the idea of culture, the focus of this 
gathering, is what is in America called the humanities. In one way or another, the 
humanistic disciplines all focus on and produce cultural knowledge, and are 
inconceivable apart from some concept of culture.  The humanities, moreoever, are the 
source of the idea that knowledge itself is culturally conditioned, an idea that has been 
expanded to include the sciences and social sciences, to their dismay.  So for me the 
idea of culture leads us directly to a consideration of the humanities, and especially of 
the differences between the humanities and other disciplines.  
2. A few years back, I wrote a book called The Humanities and the Dream of America in 
which I made the claim that as an academic category—as opposed, say, to a 
philosophical or literary one—“the humanities” was an American invention, a product 
of the post-WWII period when a victorious nation determined to create an educational 
system that not only served the needs of the nation but broadcast to the rest of the 
world, much of it devastated by the war, the values and principles on which a free 
nation was based. This system, unlike any other then in existence, was to be universal, 
liberal, and general.  That is, it was to be designed to serve the maximum number of 
people possible, to be non-vocational or instrumental in that it encompassed a variety of 
disciplines to be studied in themselves, and—the most distinctive feature of all—to be 
oriented toward the production of citizens rather than professionals or employees.  
3. The premise was that education so conceived would give all people the tools they 
needed to be able to determine their own ends beyond the mere accumulation of wealth 
or the choice of a job, and to participate in a meaningful way in governance. Education 
was to be training for life for the individual, and, for the society at large, a means of 
ensuring the equality of access to opportunity on which democracy was supposed to be 
based.  As a direct outcome of initiatives taken at this time, college enrollment grew 
quite dramatically, and a system of “community colleges” designed to prepare for 
college people whose high school training was inadequate was put in place.  In the 
words of James B. Conant, the Harvard president who convened the committee that 
provided the architecture of this system, the purpose was “to cultivate in the largest 
possible number of our future citizens an appreciation of both the responsibilities and 
the benefits which come to them because they are Americans and are free.”  While 
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many of the specifics of the program this committee came up with seem outmoded, 
impossible, or otherwise undesirable, the entirety constituted, in the words of the 
political theorist Wendy Brown, a “radical democratic event.”  
4. I draw attention to this moment because this is the moment when the idea of the 
humanities as a distinct set of disciplines—history, language and literature, study of the 
arts—came into focus as the heart and soul of the entire curriculum. The very first 
“Program in the Humanities” was created at Princeton in 1930.  The concept of the 
humanities gathered strength throughout that decade and the one following, and 
emerged by the end of the war as the focal point of what was called “general 
education.”  Indeed, the concept of the humanities was indispensable to this system.  
Without a robust concept of the humanities as the site of non-quantifiable knowledge, 
the proposed curriculum would have lacked depth and flexibility; it would have been 
unable to make any claim about developing citizens who could exercise free choice, or 
who enjoyed significant freedom.  Without the humanities conceived as the study of 
cultural knowledge to which all citizens had access, the system could not claim to create 
a sense of cultural cohesion.  And without the humanities considered as a discipline of 
evaluation and judgment, the system would lack moral seriousness.  
5. The point is that the idea of the humanities that emerged at this time grew directly out 
of a normative theory of culture. This is in fact the American innovation in educational 
theory—the educational system grows not out of the needs of the professions or the 
civil service, but out of a shared understanding of the ends of culture.  Or, to put the 
matter in another way, a strong and well articulated understanding of a common culture 
produced, as one of its offshoots, a system of education designed to support and extend 
that understanding.  And so, while the global reach of English has meant that the term 
“the humanities” is universal, the practices and even the concepts behind the humanities 
are not universally consistent.  In Portugal, in Japan, in Germany, in South Africa, the 
term means different things because the local culture has its own history, its own values, 
its own institutions, which are not necessarily reflected in the “American” concept of 
the humanities. 
6. I do not mean to claim that the United States has any monopoly on freedom, autonomy, 
self-determination, or any of the other virtues that the humanities are supposed to 
develop. Nor am I saying that the humanities actually do all the things that they are 
supposed to do, even in the very best instances.  A disconfirming reality is too 
depressingly available for anyone to make such claims.  What I am saying is that the 
humanities, as this term is understood in the United States, is a different concept from 
the humanities elsewhere because in the United States the concept grew out of a very 
specific normative understanding of culture.  This understanding properly resists 
globalization, as globalization resists it.  
7. One feature of the American system seems, however, somewhat less parochial and 
naïve than others.  I am referring to the strong emphasis on the interpretation of written 
documents.  It could be claimed—and in a forthcoming book I do claim—that the 
country was founded on the premise that all people should be interpretively competent, 
able to determine for themselves not just the meaning of texts, but the intention behind 
those texts.  Asserting this right to interpretation was the essence of the Reformation, 
and none asserted it more strongly than the English Puritans, who were forced to leave 
their country because they insisted on the irrelevance of learned clergy in the reading of 
the Bible.  Puritanism as a theocracy lasted only a few decades, but this strong 
insistence on the right of all people to interpret foundational texts was transposed onto 
the Constitution, which was, out of respect for this insistence, written in simple 
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language so all could understand it.  Universal literacy and interpretive competence 
were written into the founding document of the nation.  
8. People had to be able to interpret the foundational law because the meaning of the law, 
unlike statutory law, was always to be in dispute and always yet to be determined. The 
Constitution stipulates the conditions under which other laws or regulations may be 
enacted, and sets limits to their authority regardless of the actions of legislatures or 
other governing bodies.  Interpreting the Constitution thus becomes a civic 
responsibility enjoined on all; it is also a primary means of social progress, as groups 
appeal to the Supreme Court to see in the Constitution what they see.  While there are 
different theories of Constitutional interpretation, the most powerful—even, to some, 
disturbingly powerful—approach appeals to the “original intent” of the Founders and 
Framers of the text.  The humanities in America, and in particular the discipline of 
English, respond to this feature of American civic life by stressing the interpretation of 
texts, and especially interpretation based on the concept of intention. 
9. The Constitution is manifestly the product of a cultural theory—the same theory that 
has produced an educational system in which “the humanities,” construed in a particular 
way, have emerged. It is a peculiar system, but in its aspiration to freedom and equality 
of opportunity, its derivation from a concept of culture, it has, I think, a lot to 
recommend it—more, perhaps, than a system in which access to higher education is 
restricted by examinations or other means, or one in which education is itself restricted 








“Cultures Matter: Modest Proposals for Preventing National Traditions from being a 
Burden to Research and for Making Travelling Concepts Beneficial to the Transnational 
Study of Culture”  
 
1. As both the interest that various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences have 
paid to culture, and the co-existence of various kinds of British Cultural Studies, 
American Cultural Studies, German Kulturwissenschaften, and other national traditions 
already serve to demonstrate, the study of culture is essentially an interdisciplinary and 
an international field of research. With regard to both the range of disciplines that are 
concerned with culture and its international dimension, the study of culture is 
characterized by theoretical and methodological pluralism as well as 
multiperspectivism. The study of such a broad research domain as culture demands 
novel forms of interdisciplinary research, crossing the boundaries between disciplines 
and different academic cultures of knowledge. 
2. Although the development of Literary and Cultural Studies, just like other disciplines in 
the humanities, has been characterized by an ongoing trend towards internationalization 
and globalization, there are still marked differences between various national research 
cultures and traditions. The cultural and national specificity of approaches to the study 
of culture can hardly be overlooked when comparing, for instance, British Cultural 
Studies and German ‘Kulturwissenschaften’, which are both concerned with the domain 
of culture, but differ considerably with regard to their respective research traditions, 
conceptual frameworks and methodologies. 
3. Such differences between national approaches testify to the fact that cultures in general, 
and cultures of research and education in particular, matter, i.e. the study of culture is 
itself very much a cultural practice which is characterized by national specificity. 
Although this is seldom acknowledged, let alone subjected to self-reflexive research, 
different approaches to the study of culture are themselves culturally and historically 
conditioned and thus subject to change and cultural variation. Such differences between 
national cultures of research can pose serious obstacles to both the transfer of 
approaches and concepts from one national research culture to another, and the 
development of genuinely transnational approaches to the study of culture. 
4. There are arguably several reasons why approaches to the study of culture as developed 
and practised in different national and institutional contexts still display considerable 
differences, even in an age of globalisation and worldwide mobility, especially among 
academics. Among the most important reasons that can explain such cultural and 
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national differences are language, intellectual styles (sensu Galtung; cf. Nünning, 
„Wissenschaftsstile“), the cultural contexts and historical development of disciplines 
and approaches, and institutional differences between research cultures and their 
traditions. Differences in intellectual style manifest themselves in a number of concrete 
and tangible ways, shaping both prevalent research agendas and practices. While 
German ‘Kulturwissenschaften’ display a predilection for theorizing, what constitutes 
the lowest common denominator of most of the features specific to British Cultural 
Studies is a much more pragmatic and empirical orientation, a clear preference for 
particulars and concrete ‘facts,’ and a concomitant distrust of generalities and 
abstractions. 
5. As a comparison between German ‘Kulturwissenschaften’ and British Cultural Studies 
can serve to show, the differences between these national traditions of studying culture 
are still so big that it would be unwarranted to speak of transnational approaches as 
though they actually existed. In spite of some similarities with regard to subject matter 
and methods, the German version of Kulturwissenschaft should be distinguished from 
the special brand of Cultural Studies developed in Britain. At the risk at 
oversimplification, the main differences between British (and American) Cultural 
Studies and German ‘Kulturwissenschaften’ can be located on at least five levels. 
 First, British Cultural Studies were developed as a response to concrete social and 
political challenges of the British class-system and as a politically motivated project 
aimed at producing changes in society and strategies of resistance; in this research 
tradition, culture and politics have been inextricably intertwined. By contrast, the 





 century, has quite a different genealogy, lineage, and non-political 
agenda, being largely an academic enterprise which explores cultural phenomena as 
objects of academic research, not with an eye to engendering political change. 
 Second, while British Cultural Studies is characterized by an ideological position and 
marked by a Marxist approach, German ‘Kulturwissenschaften’ display a more 
pluralistic, multiperspectival theoretical orientation, exploring symbolic forms and ways 
of worldmaking. 
 Third, as the term ‘Kulturwissenschaften’ already indicates, there is a strong emphasis 
and methodological insistence on the scientific quality of the discipline in the German 
tradition in which the study of culture has been characterized as a form of textual 
science. This has far-reaching implications for the scholar’s position and self-
understanding, which is quite different from that of scholars working in the British 
tradition of cultural studies. 
 Fourth, as the very name of its most renowned and important institution, the 
“Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies” already indicates, British 
Cultural Studies has tended to expand the concept of culture from high-brow culture to 
popular culture, paving the way for a new approach to contemporary forms of popular 
culture, on which the Birmingham school largely focussed. By way of contrast, German 
‘Kulturwissenschaften’ has favoured a broader anthropological and semiotic concept of 
culture, taking a wider range of cultural objects, and a broader diachronic perspective 
into consideration. 
 Being an integral part of the respective national, institutional and academic cultures 
from which they have emerged, British Cultural Studies and German 
‘Kulturwissenschaften’ have fifthly developed different research questions, topics and 
methods. 
6. One of the problems and impediments for the development of transnational approaches 
to the study of culture results from the prevailing tendency to ‘import’ British (or 
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American) Cultural Studies into other (e.g. German or Portuguese) academic and 
institutional contexts and merely emulate or imitate the imported model(s). The main 
problem with such a transfer, however, is that while British Cultural Studies must be 
seen against the background of Britain’s class system, the American debates about race, 
class and gender, or the revision of the Western canon, only make sense in the context 
of the US’ multicultural society. The strength of the study of culture as practised in e.g. 
Germany, the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries, for that matter, resides precisely 
in the fact that they can apply the differences between their own and the foreign 
culture(s) in a fruitful manner. Both the canon debates (and revisions) with their focus 
on race, class and gender and the British and American forms of Cultural Studies can 
thus themselves be seen as (highly interesting!) objects of inquiry, both from the point 
of view of English and American Studies as practised in Germany and other countries 
and in a broader transnational framework for the study of culture(s). 
7. Rather than just taking a particular approach for granted or uncritically trying to adopt 
or emulate either British Cultural Studies or American Cultural Studies, cultural theory 
and the study of culture should first of all regard them as an object of inquiry in its own 
right, representing as they do complex manifestations of e.g. Englishness (or 
Britishness) and Americanness respectively. Just as there is arguably a ‘national style’ 
of English literary criticism, historiography, and cultural studies. German 
‘Kulturwissenschaften’ likewise share a number of epistemological claims, discursive 
strategies and institutional practices that set them off from their American and British 
counterparts. The German term ‘Kulturwissenschaften’, just like 
‘Literaturwissenschaften’, is lost in translation. It serves to emphasize the scientificity 
of the discipline that it designates, implicitly claiming that the study of culture can be as 
scientific as any discipline in the hard sciences. As Peter Zima has shown in a 
pioneering article, the term ‘Literaturwissenschaften’ in the German sense is very much 
“a language- and culture-bound phenomenon” that “becomes questionable as soon as it 
is projected into an intercultural context” (Zima 26). The same holds true for the term 
‘Kulturwissenschaften’, which should not be confused with the English term ‘cultural 
studies’. What is at stake here is much more than just a question of terminology, in that 
there is a semantic rupture between the German and English sociolinguistic contexts 
that concerns the constitution and traditions of the respective disciplines and research 
cultures as a whole, including the ways in which they construct their objects, define 
their objectives, develop their methodologies, select their subject matter, and practise 
the study of culture. 
8. While there is a broad range of different national traditions of studying culture, 
including various kinds of British Cultural Studies and American Cultural Studies, but 
more recently also of ‘Latino/a Cultural Studies’, the development of genuinely 
transnational, or even trans-European, approaches to the study of culture is still a 
desideratum for future research rather than an established fact in that such a project does 
not yet exist as a fully-fledged theoretical or analytical framework. 
9. There are, however, several recent contributions to research that have fostered, or are 
fostering, the development of transnational approaches to the study of culture. These 
include approaches that either cut across national traditions or that have successfully 
travelled from one research culture to others, e.g. a number of influential “cultural 
turns” (Bachmann-Medick) in the humanities, or ‘cultural sciences’ 
(Kulturwissenschaften), and the notions of ‘travelling concepts’ (Bal, 
Nünning/Neumann) and ‘translation’ as promising ways of overcoming boundaries 
between different research cultures and national traditions. Approaches that have cut 
across disciplinary and national research traditions include e.g. cultural semiotics 
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(‘Kultursemiotik’, see Posner), cultural anthropology, historical anthropology, literary 
anthropology, the new cultural history, cultural ecology, and area studies (for an 
overview, see Nünning/Nünning). Although the traditions, research foci and 
methodologies of these different ways of studying culture differ quite substantially, all 
of these approaches embrace both inter- or transdisciplinary collaboration and an 
international or even global orientation. These approaches and developments have been 
conducive to transcending the limitations of national research traditions, in fostering 
transnational as well as transcultural approaches to the study of culture, and to 
foregrounding both global and transnational cultural issues and the concept of 
transnationalism itself. 
10. Much more work, however, needs to be done in order to gauge the complex differences 
between national research cultures, to reconfigure and reconceive particular national 
kinds of ‘cultural studies’ as a transnational study of culture, and, even more so, to 
develop fully-fledged transnational approaches and concepts for the study of culture. It 
would also be desirable to enhance the dialogue among the approaches and disciplines 
involved in the study of culture, and among different cultures of research, thus fostering 
self-reflexive, interdisciplinary, international, and potentially even transnational 
approaches to the study of culture. In order to move beyond nationally based boundaries 
and academic styles, transnational approaches to the study of culture need to investigate 
in detail the (usually unacknowledged) presuppositions, discursive practices and 
structural features of its own research traditions, which have so far been largely 
unacknowledged and have tended to become naturalized. Such a project also involves a 
sustained dialogue about the key concepts that are used in order to define the subject-
matter, research areas or domains, and the theoretical and methodological frameworks 
deployed. Transnational and transcultural approaches to the study of culture require the 
development of a new set of guiding principles, travelling concepts and other ways of 
academic worldmaking that expand the limited horizons of British Cultural Studies, 
American Cultural Studies, German ‘Kulturwissenschaften’, and other nationally 
specific research traditions. 
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Paulo de Medeiros 
“Splinters, Freedoms, Matter” 
 
To speak of a crisis in the Humanities is not merely a cliché. It is also at one and the same time 
a recognition of the conflictual and conflicting nature of the Humanities and of human societies, 
and an easy opening to just ignore the real threats directed at the very core of the Humanities 
and what might be understood as critical thought. The stakes are high; too high for any one of us 
to simply resign ourselves and accept the way the world is turning because we might feel too 
small or insignificant or removed from the sites of power. Because if we do, if we simply 
capitulate, lulled by a false sense of complacency, inevitability and our own relatively 
privileged positions we shall have betrayed the trust society has placed on us as both bearers of 
tradition and questioning critics.. There is a duty, a duty common to any citizen, but very 
especially so, also an intellectual duty, to question, expose and resist the insidious and pervasive 
ways in which basic advancements in social justice, including the right to a free and public 
education, are being systematically threatened and eroded. To that effect Adorno’s warning at 
the opening of the Minima Moralia has not only not lost any of its incisive power, but, 
unfortunately, has never been more actual and urgent: “Der Blick aufs Leben ist übergegangen 
in die Ideologie, die darüber betrügt, daß es keines mehr gibt” (“Our perspective of life has 
passed into an ideology which conceals the fact that there is life no longer,” Jephcott, 1974). I 
would thus like to propose adopting an Adornian “splintered” vision (“The splinter in your eye 
is the best magnifying glass”) towards the question of the Humanities for two reasons: for one, 
the very concept of the Humanities as it might have been originally conceived has been 
necessarily broken. It shattered as the flaws and blind spots of Enlightenment  discourse, that 
still allowed for it to remain in so many instances an instrument for domination and the 
preservation of privilege, have been exposed. And, secondly, the potentially emancipatory 
premises of that same discourse have become increasingly targeted by reactionary forces 
ruthlessly bent of turning back the process of democratization and social justice that 
characterized, at one point, the very notion of western societies and for which the Humanities 
were both a guarantee and a motor for progress. 
The notion of progress itself has also already been problematized, if not completely discarded, 
and I am not in any way advocating a return to a belief in a teleological understanding of human 
society. However, it is crucial to distinguish a progressive critique of progress and a reactionary 
sleigh of hand through which the rightful gains in democratic rule and social rights would be 
destroyed. At this point it is useful to recall how Henry Giroux has set the question before us 
when he affirmed: “The crisis of class is not restricted to an economic crisis. Workers are not 
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merely exploited; they are also under assault through forms of neo-liberal intellectual violence 
that diminish their sense of agency and depoliticize the spaces in which they may produce the 
language and social relations necessary to resist the ravages of economic Darwinism” (2013). 
As our societies – at least in the West – become increasingly dominated by fear and through the 
continuous implementation of all of the mechanisms set up in order to increase that fear while 
pretending to assuage or control it, this is a point that can easily be forgotten. Yet, together with 
questions of race and gender, basic issues of inequality in our societies risk being sidelined, 
dismissed and even denied, with an obvious consequence: the sliding into an amorphous and 
uncritical mass in which workers receive as much training as considered necessary to be 
productive and any form of difference will not be tolerated. The extent to which the crisis of the 
Humanities has come to occupy a great many intellectuals can be glimpsed by the establishment 
at Princeton of a taskforce charged with inquiring into the “Future of the Humanities”. In its 
October 2015 report we can read right from the start how the humanities and with it the study of 
culture in all of its forms is inextricably tied up with financial issues: “Universities have become 
increasingly identified in the public mind with mere vocational training, but a supple education 
in the arts and humanities is a good investment in the modern environment, however 
paradoxical that may seem to anxious parents and students. (…) Numerous studies show that, 
on the basis of such a preparation, it is far from being financial or career suicide to major in a 
Humanities subject, especially if we look at the earnings of majors…” 
(http://www.princeton.edu/strategicplan/files/Humanities-Task-Force-report-2015.pdf). Without 
wanting to give the impression that the University or the Humanities can (or ever could) 
disassociate themselves from the world – the opposite will be my contention precisely – I still 
find it deeply disturbing when such a distinguished body of colleagues clearly sees no issue with 
making success in and of the Humanities dependent on one sole factor, the economic one. But 
none of this is really new of course. As Alain Badiou has made more than clear, reflecting on 
the causes for the attacks of 13
th
 November in Paris, justice should always strive to enlarge 
public space but for the last thirty years we have observed an ever increasing and suffocating 
privatization. So culture also tends more an more to become either a private affair – private 
property that offers the prospect of a generous rate of return on the initial investment – or a mass 
commodity serving more often than not to generate controlled and marketable desires in a 
vicious circle that creates the illusion of freedom and choice while reinforcing absolute forms of 
control that deny any form of agency to the individual, especially as that too becomes a suspect 
category. 
Rather than discussing the “future” of the Humanities – how many times does an appeal to the 
“new” hide an attempt to keep things as they are and preserve the transmission of power along 
established lines as Giuseppe di Lampedusa so powerfully showed in The Leopard? Instead, 
what I find urgent is a reconsideration of the materiality of culture. Without wanting to merely 
hark back to discussions on materialism and dialectics, but also without totally reifying the 
subject and transform it into “new materialisms” that tend to ignore the difficult and even 
dehumanizing material conditions, which a massive amount of people still must endure. There is 
a need to pay close attention to those very simple issues that are at the root of so many 
masterpieces and that go on affecting our lives in profound ways. While rejecting any form of 
nostalgia I think that only in relating the present to the past – our contemporary understanding 
of the past that is – can we make sense of our predicaments and imagine solutions for the ills 
that afflict us and that, as Badiou stressed in the title of his recent lecture, come from long ago. 
If our present world puts forward ever changing and complex processes of cultural relations our 
task is to analyse them, without falling in to the trap and temptation of believing that critique 
amounts to social change, but in the firm conviction that theory and praxis go together and 
mutually inform each other. Ultimately, as much as we might worry about the financial success 
of future generations, we owe them as much, if not more, to remain intellectually honest. If 
culture is to matter we must pay attention to its matter. 
   
 
 




Isabel Capeloa Gil 
“Culture is never neutral or disinterested” 
 
Having increasingly acquired prominence over the past decade and a 
half, the study of conflict in the field of culture could be easily 
mistaken as the serendipitous result of living a conflict-torn 
temporality. But this would be a naïve assessment. There are no more 
conflicts today than in the past, and more importantly conflict and 
culture are not simply brought together by a representational nexus or 
by political design. In other terms, culture’s relation with conflict does 
not simply happen by dint of representing a lived violent event or a 
conflictual interaction, nor can it be subsumed to a supporting role in 
the geopolitics of what Samuel Huntington named the global 
civilizations and their ‘fault line conflicts’ (Huntington, 1996:207). 
And yet, even though the argument I take here refutes the determinism 
that binds culture with violent conflict, it is no less true that without 
conflict there is no culture, and that without culture there are no 
conflicts. 
1. A brief genealogy: Foundational texts in the Greek and Jewish traditions already 
expound an embedding of conflict and culture. Hesiod in Erga (vv.14-26) distinguishes 
between bad conflict, associated with Eris, the producer of strife and communal 
disruption, and good conflict, connoted with the reuniting of social bonds through the 
work of sacrifice. This same distinction between disruptive and productive conflict is 
laid out in multiple texts of the Jewish Bible, in which case the wars with Babylon or 
Egypt would be an example of the former whereas Isaac’s sacrifice speaks to the latter. 
In this mytho-poetical dimension, conflict results from the tension between the social 
and human realm and transcendental norms, a tension that is ultimately resolved 
through ritual practice. Another strategy equates conflict with aggressiveness, namely 
with the human biological propensity to act violently, as it comes across in the widely 
diverse and even contradictory approaches of Thomas Hobbes’ liberal thinking, Freud’s 
cultural theory or even Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s behavioral analysis. In this context, culture acts 
as a repressive external set of norms working to curb the violence within, its work has a 
corrective dimension that rests on a conflictual interaction with an essentially violent 
nature. A relevant marker of change is apparent in the turn taken by early 20th century 
sociology. In 1918, in the conference, ‘The Conflict of Modern Culture’, Georg Simmel 
defines conflict as a sociogenetic structure within the cultural. Culture is no longer 
observed as a repressive mechanism and the corrective of an ‘imperfect’ nature, but 
rather a process of socialization that integrates difference. Hence be it in the form of a 
productive and creative mechanism, conducive to artistic production, or as a disruptive 
action epitomized in war, conflict is the work of culture. Simmel’s work is 
groundbreaking in suggesting that culture is structured upon the negotiation of 
difference and that part of this process will be inevitably unsuccessful and lead to 
violent strife. Consequently, the principle of identity is perceived to be founded on the 
collision (productive or disruptive) with difference. 
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2. Conflict is inscribed in the very matrix of the cultural. The production of culture is 
marked by difference and it is the interaction amongst these distinctions that structures 
the flow of energies amongst the several threads of the web of culture. Conflict, in this 
basic assumption, is understood as the play of the differential, supporting key themes of 
the study of culture such as identity and diversity, memory and trauma, the translation 
of cultures and globalization, dislocation and emplacement, mediation, integration and 
exclusion. Hence, if there is no culture without difference, there is no culture without 
conflict. Be it as the necessary tension that structures dialogue or as the ‘enormous 
opposition’ (GT, KSAI: 25) between what in Nietzsche’s terms would be the drive for 
form and structure and the drive for creative dissolution that grounds the work of art 
and culture[1], conflict is what makes the work of culture possible. 
3. Conflict lays bare that the work of culture is set on coming to terms with the 
existence of cultures. The cultural has an existence which is not its own alone. It is 
sustained by a condition of interdependency, of mutual engagement, which is always 
situated and precarious, and it is a circumstance of a creation/production that does not 
belong to itself, whose meaning is ultimately negotiated for, by and with its others. 
Culture then allows us to address plurality and deal with the existence of otherness. 
4. Culture is never neutral or disinterested and hence it will inevitably be present when 
difference is transformed into strife and war. In approaching conflict situations from a 
cultural perspective, one is struck by two dominant processes: first, the ways in which a 
cultural system successfully reproduces and even consolidates itself by inscribing 
conflict into its dominant practices and, second, the ways in which a conflict constitutes 
a symbolic encounter that threatens to affect deeply, even to transform, the meanings 
that make up the fabric of any culture. Thus, conflicts lay bare the normative 
mechanisms of a cultural system and the vulnerable, incomplete and provisional 
character of that normativity. It follows that conflicts – their regulation, representation 
and particularly their recollection – constitute privileged loci for cultural analysis. 
5. As a cultural marker of a situated production of knowledge, conflict, as dialogue 
and difference, inhabits the production of critical thought. The ways in which 
knowledge is produced within the field of culture reflect the work of conjuncture, 
institutional abode and lived experience. Clearly how and what we think in academia is 
not simply the result of disciplinary difference, but also of the contingency of time and 
the multiple spaces inhabited by scholarly subjectivities. Research practice in the 
humanities promotes a renewed questioning, an inspection of received postulates, a self-
reflexive attitude on the norms and the practices that regulate the field. This is perhaps 
the utopian approach that got so many cultural studies scholars on the wrong foot, but I 
would argue, this is also the horizon of relevance of a field continuously in the making 
and necessarily in need of embracing modes of scholarly production beyond the 
hallowed space of western academia. Arguably, then, conflict speaks to the very work 
of critical thought, when it is understood as a practice of interference. This is 
metaphorically condensed in the literary formula of Herman Melville’s “Bartlebly the 
Scrivener’s” assertion ‘I prefer not to’. In fact, culture studies is defined by a strategic 
conceptual injunction to do otherwise. Rather than reproducing accepted knowledge, 
culture studies recuperates the task of the humanities as a practice of interference in the 
dominant organization of knowledge. As Jacques Rancière puts it in The Politics of 
Aesthetics, its work is about: “ways of doing and making that intervene in the general 
distribution of ways of doing and making” (Rancière, 2004:13). The defining attitude of 
a culture studies scholar is that of a cosmopolitan criticality that is proper to the 
humanities, looking at the plurality of cultures and embracing that difference in 
language, value, memory, religion and all the other different markers that structure our 
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ecology of cultures. Embracing this difference is not a naïve stance. It means to be 
aware of the tensions, of the conflicts, albeit continuously struggling to avoid any 
reification about the ultimate inevitability of war. 
[1] “Their two deities of art, Apollo and Dionysos, provide the starting-point for our recognition that there exists in 
the world of the Greeks an enormous opposition, both in origin and goals, between the Apolline art of the image-
maker or sculptor […] and the imageless art of music, which is that of Dionysos. These two very different drives 
exist side by side, mostly in open conflict, stimulating and provoking one another to give birth to ever-new, more 











“Culture and genes interact since millions of years”  
 
1. The common notion in many if not most parts of the humanities claims a non relation 
between culture and cognition. Whatever culture is, culture is not affected by cognition. To 
know something about cognition elucidates nothing about culture, so they say. Hence, for 
cultural studies any findings of cognitive psychology or neuroscience, from social psychology 
or even from science of reading are of no relevance for cultural studies. The realm of biological 
evolution seems to stop when culture came into play. Insights from areas of biological research 
are simply a naturalistic fallacy and any kind of cognitive literary studies is a neodarwinistic 
shortening of what cultural studies should do. “Essentialism” is the catchword to reject any 
approach to integrate culture and cognition into the humanities. 
2. In the tradition of German academia the opposition of culture and cognition is mapped by the 
contrast of nomothetic natural sciences vs. ‘verstehende Geisteswissenschaften’ (hermeneutical 
humanities). Dilthey concept of ‘Geisteswissenschaft’ ignores by purpose and theory early 
empirical psychology as well as phenomenology and other more or less scientific approaches on 
cognition of his time, and stated, that both areas are divided by an insurmountable gap of 
methodological differences. From then to now only little attempts were made by groups like 
Russian Formalism or Structuralism to question the thesis of the non-scientific nature of cultural 
studies. 
3. Against dominant theories cognitive approaches in the humanities suggest a different concept 
of the relation between culture and cognition. In this perspective culture is part of the biological 
evolution. More precisely culture and genes interact since millions of years, and the culture-
gene coevolution has not yet ended. Humans are a cultural species and our cognition arises from 
the synthesis of our cultural and social natures, from the very fact that we readily learn from 
others and live in interconnected groups, which differs more in forms of social and cultural 
organizations than the rest of the primate order combined. Culture and cognition made each 
other up and cultural explanations become but one type of evolutionary explanation. Since 
evolution drives groups of primates to develop bigger brain culture is a necessary function to 
make use of big brains. Human cognition is social cognition since millions of years. In this 
framework the study of culture and the study of cognition are two sides of the same coin. 
4. If humans are a cultural species, then one of the most crucial adaptation is humans ability to 
keenly observe and learn from other people, mostly from the more prestigious and skilled, with 
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biased to co-ethnics, co-language, and co-sexes. Humans can interfere conspecific’s acts, and 
intentions, beliefs, and strategies. This is variously termed mentalizing, or theory of mind. 
Human cognition differs systematically from other primates. As culture become the primary 
driver of our species genetic evolution (some 2 million years ago) cognition was changed to 
improve social learning and cultural intelligence. We use more energy for cognition than other 
species, the myelination makes human brain more efficient and is developed later in infancy to 
make children’s brain more plastic, and human neocortex sends corticospinal connections 
deeper into the motor neurons, spinal cord, and brain stem than in other mammals. We can 
better run and throw and even these neurological changes alter cognition and enable us to 
become a cultural species. By cooking, or the ability to change the colour of skin and of eyes, to 
change to lactase persistence etc. it has been consistently shown how culture can be among the 
most powerful selections pressures created in nature. The cooking-and-fire revolution, the 
projectile-weapons revolution, the spoken-language revolution, the agricultural revolution are 
among many others miles stones how culture drives cognition. 
5. Languages are part of the cultural-gene coevolution. Language enables more complex cultural 
trajectories and at the same time culture can influence the size and complexity of 
communicative repertoires. Like whistle languages came up in steep mountain terrains, 
vocabulary sizes expand with size and structure of populations, languages with more speakers 
tend to have more sounds/phonems but shorter words, and sonority of languages changes with 
temperature, diverse acoustics environments prefer different types of language systems. As 
findings by cross-cultural psychology has shown language systems influence cognition in many 
ways. Most common is the difference between holistic vs. analytic thinking, between a more 
society-orientated thinking style in East Asian vs. a more individualism-oriented approach in 
Western cultures. Like languages, techniques, or rituals, also the arts differ according to the 
evolutionary driven interplay of cognition and culture. Learning to read changes the brain, 
basically by building a specific area, called letter box. Again culture alters cognition. We can 
trace the correlation of culture and cognition even in the structure of neurons. Culture matters 
and cognition too. 
6. In this coevolutionary model one can understand culture not without understanding cognition, 
and human cognition would be an opaque riddle to be understood without understanding 
culture. In sum, cultural studies should think about, why not explore the correlation between 
culture and cognition more closely. Rewriting cultural theory as part of a larger history of 












“Scripts, frames and mental models are tools of understanding” 
The following theses are based on a few presuppositions: 
Although my conception of culture is shaped by the semiotic approach to culture, according to 
which three dimensions of culture (i.e. the material, social and mental dimension) can be 
distinguished, the following observations will focus mainly on the mental (cognitive) dimension 
of culture and its relation to the material dimension, e.g. in the form of texts and narratives. In 
addition, the term culture serves as a shorthand for the pluralities of (sub)cultures prevalent in a 
given community, which are defined by transcultural relations and by continuous change. 
In addition, I conceptualise minds as embodied minds (sensu Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 
1991) and the brain as a cultural organ characterised by plasticity and molded by cultural 
factors; my epistemological framework is that of enactivism. 
Theses: 
(1) There is a reciprocal relationship between culture and cognition (this is a minor supplement 
to the brilliant exposition by Gerhard Lauer).  
Scripts, frames and mental models are tools of understanding. The scripts and schemata that 
help us to understand human beings and sequences of action are shaped by culture: e.g. by tacit 
and explicit knowledge, by hierarchies of values and attitudes. In addition, these cognitive tools 
are acquired – and modified, revised and changed – not only in the process of acculturation, but 
also by dealing with the challenges of one’s daily life in a given culture, by social practices and 
the experiences that individuals (and communities) make throughout their lives. 
There is a reciprocal relationship between culture and cognition in that, on the one hand, the 
experiences that are possible within specific cultures shape our brains and our minds, our scripts 
and frames. On the other hand, these experiences are processed and interpreted by means of 
cognitive scripts and frames; the way we act and form our environment is influenced by the use 
of these scripts. Cognition shapes culture just as much as culture shapes cognition. 
(2) Narrative is one of the major ways of understanding life worlds (Jerome Bruner, Raymond 
Mar). 
Daily encounters, the vicissitudes of life, human beings and events are interpreted by means of 
narrative. Cognitive scripts were reconceptionalised by Roger Schank and Robert Abelson as 
narrative scripts, or a “story skeleton” which provides a basic tool of interpretation. In addition 
to such scripts which can be used in standard situations, complex narrative modes of 
understanding provide the means to understand complex situations. Narratives can be regarded 
as “pattern-forming cognitive system[s]” (David Herman) or “high-level generative models” 
(Hirsh, Mar, Peterson). The modes of interpretation available to individuals are shaped by 
cultures and the stock of stories which are in circulation in given communities or part of cultural 
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memories. To provide an example: the ability to construct one’s life story is acquired in several 
steps throughout adolescence and formed by culturally accepted modes of narrative (e.g. 
implied importance of temporality and causality; individual vs. collective agency) and by 
(auto)biographic stories (Katherine Nelson, Tilman Habermas). 
(3) If narrative is one of the major modes of understanding live worlds, there are two 
implications to be considered: 
First, narrative competence, the ability to understand and create narratives, is an important 
means of social cognition; it encompasses more than what is called ‘theory of mind’, and is 
crucial for empathy and perspective taking. 
Second, is desirable to know a broad variety of narratives (if possible from different times and 
cultures), featuring different modes of interpretation, since this knowledge can enlarge and 
refine one’s tools for understanding. 
(4) Fictional stories (particularly novels) can be important means of enhancing social cognition. 
Many fictional stories encourage readers to use their interpersonal abilities, their empathy, their 
‘theory of mind’ and perspective taking in order to make sense of fictional characters and 
fictional worlds. Depending on the complexity of the story and of the narrative conventions 
inducing or blocking perspective taking and encouraging readers to empathise with or distance 
themselves from the characters, works of fiction can refine readers’ abilities of social cognition. 
(5) (Fictional) narratives are a powerful means of persuasion and of cultural change. 
Empirical studies have shown that, whether fictional or factual, narratives can influence readers’ 
cultural encyclopaedia and attitudes. By influencing listeners and readers, narratives are an 
important means of shaping cultures. Stories can confirm, perpetuate, revise, subvert or change 
implicit knowledge, hierarchies of values, and attitudes. 
(6) Fictional stories are potentially more effective than overt means of teaching. 
Since most adult readers know that fiction is ‘just’ fiction, i.e. something that is imagined and 
not meant to provide factual knowledge, they usually think themselves immune to the 
persuasive power of fiction and do not consciously scrutinise and check the implied beliefs and 
the values embedded in certain stories. If they read fiction as fiction, i.e. for pleasure and in a 
disinterested way, and immerse themselves in the fictional world, they fulfil an important pre-
condition for changing their beliefs (Melanie Green, Arthur Jacobs). It is likely that they 
integrate the facts and attitudes encountered in such narratives in their knowledge stores. In 
addition, many of the barriers impeding empathy and perspective taking are either diminished or 
not applicable when reading fictional stories. For instance, reading fiction is ‘safe’; one does not 
run the risk of social consequences when trying out different attitudes or experiences. 
(7) Despite the productiveness of research in such fields as cognitive narratology and cognitive 
psychology in general and the effects of reading in particular, much more work needs to be 
done, especially in the following areas: 
Particularly in the present situation, when more and more (young) adults read fewer novels, 
while spending more and more time using the new media, we need more research on the effects 
of different modes of reading, for instance on the differences of the consequences of ‘deep 
reading’ which accompanies immersion and the kind of interrupted ‘skim-reading’ that is 
encouraged by the new (social) media. 
Although there are many productive studies in the field of ‘ethical criticism’, it would be 
profitable to know even more about embedded values in narratives: If narratives are persuasive 
and can change readers’ encyclopaedia and attitudes, we need to know more about what kinds 
of knowledge and values are embedded in particular narratives. What are the dominant attitudes 
and values that are encouraged by reading specific (popular) texts and genres? Which tools are 
most promising in order to identify such embedded values? 
We also need more research on the kinds of narratives and narrative conventions which heighten 
the persuasiveness of particular texts. There are many empirical studies on the effects of 
narratives and on states of mind which heighten or diminish the persuasiveness of a text. 
However, up to now there have been only few philological or narratological studies which focus 
on the persuasive potential of textual features, and even fewer collaborative studies by 
researchers from the fields of cognitive psychology and literary studies. 
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“Culture therefore shapes the mind as well as the mind shapes culture”,  
Beck’s risk. In his laudation on Zygmunt Bauman – one of his last public statements – Ulrich 
Beck said (I translate from the German text): “It would be nice if that what Max Weber 
announced gloomily as the bureaucratic rationality of control would still control; it would be 
nice if – as Adorno and Foucault predicted – only the terror of consumption and humanism 
would terrorize us; it would be nice if the functioning of systems could be restored by appealing 
to ‘autopoiesis’. It would be nice if it were just a question of a crisis of modernity which could 
be mitigated with liturgical formula: more market, more technology, more functional 
differentiation, more rational choice, more growth, more weapons, more drones, more 
computers, more Internet and so on. It’s not a big deal to admit, that even we social scientists 
are reduced to silence in view of a reality which overruns us.” The conditions of liquid 
modernity, continuous change, constant mobility and recent threats of violence and terrorism 
make it impossible to transform experiences into attitudes, models of behavior, convictions and 
moral concepts which could work as common characteristics of a whole generation, time or 
culture – as Bauman explains in many of his studies. The silence, to which social sciences and 
the humanities feel reduced, is a consequence of their findings as much as of the conditions 
which led to them. However, science and humanities must not be reduced to silence. On the 
contrary, the conditions of an overwhelming reality ask for new forms of dialogue: research on 
liquid modernity needs liquid disciplines. It should be possible to read Beck and Bauman side 
by side with Semir Zeki, Bruce Wexler or Ernst Pöppel: on the way to Cognitive Culture 
Studies. 
The concept concept. When Bauman points to the impossibility to transform experiences into 
attitudes, models of behavior, convictions and moral concepts he addresses one of the key issues 
in the research of social cognition. What Leonard Talmy has termed the Cognitive Culture 
System is all about the acquisition, exercise and the imparting of concepts, patterns and norms. 
Culture seen from the perspective of the brain is a set of concepts which allows to share 
meanings, predict, expect and condition behavior and to develop all kinds of moral and 
ideological standpoints. Culture therefore shapes the mind as well as the mind shapes culture. 
Cultural activities even transform the brain as the famous comparison of the cerebral structures 
of a piano player and a string player has shown. Other well-known examples refer to cultural 
difference as e.g. between collectivism and individualism in Eastern and Western societies 
which even lead (or base on) certain genetic differences, evidenced by statistical findings. There 
are two main challenges for future research: First, it has to be clarified “whether the 
embodiment theory of conceptual representations can serve as an integrated framework for both 
concrete and abstract concepts” (Kiefer/Pulvermüller, 2012). And second, the constitution in 
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form and content of those concepts has to be studied under the conditions of the embodiment 
theory. Embodied concepts ask for a permanent effort to guarantee a correspondence between 
conception and experience which is simultaneously the motor for change and for resistance to 
change – causing under certain circumstances the risk of no-response and silence, of distress 
and a notion of inconvenience in liquidity. 
The metaphor metaphor. Conceptual integration is one of those “travelling concepts” which 
have found their way from Cognitive Sciences to Culture Studies (e.g. A. Nünning, 2011). The 
challenges of liquid modernity can be addressed by the theory of blending though in a 
metaphorical way. Where metaphor theory helps to understand the conceptual integration of a 
reference space on the one hand and a presentation space on the other, it explains how new 
meanings emerge from the blending of different mental spaces. Change and innovation are the 
distinctive qualities of metaphor as long as it does not crystalize into a regular form of 
representation. However, future research on conceptual integration might like to ask less for the 
conditions of change and innovation (as they are given), but for a better understanding of the 
forms of presentation which offer a certain kind of stability, indispensable to blending. We 
would need the metaphor of the metaphor to understand the common bases of representation 
without which no metaphor could ever make sense. Sense is not a matter of language, but of 
concepts (otherwise translation would not be possible) – and culture their accommodation. L. 
and P.A. Brandt have brilliantly shown how the sentence “This surgeon is a butcher” makes 
sense as a metaphor. They insist on the reflection of a “third space”, in which the force-
dynamics of “agent”, “harm” and “patient” give relevance to the virtual space of blending from 
which meaning emerges. Cognitive Culture Studies could be the discipline to describe both 
relevance and presentation spaces as different examples of embodied cultural concepts 
interacting even in the construction of surprisingly new meanings. The metaphor is liquid; 
relevance and presentation are its solid and stable ground. 
Critique critique. Going back to solid and stables grounds (or better: to the concept concept) is 
a challenge to Culture Studies. It is a matter of operation fields. Culture Studies claim to deal 
with those phenomena which are bigger than the individual (which would be dealt with by 
Psychology) and smaller than the universal (which would be dealt with by Biology). Culture 
Studies stand to Biology and Psychology like history to evolution and ontogenesis. Culture 
Studies deal with the institutional, textual and mental phenomena which constitute a defined 
operation field being simultaneously out of Biology and towards Psychology: making sense of 
the Human. Culture covers the distance between the solid and stable ground and the 
arbitrariness of a fluid singularity. That is why Culture Studies are central for a better 
understanding of society as much as of the individual. However, its central position has either 
led to a cut with all kinds of solid and stable grounds (namely in the rejection of certain 
methods) or – on the contrary – to a new submission to science and its empirical promises of 
exactness. The third way we suggest could transform such exclusiveness in a new form of 
dialog in which sciences learn as much from Culture Studies as Culture Studies from its solid 
and stable ground. Cognitive Culture Studies would claim a new critique critique asking if and 
how one can be critical without being normative. Could the concept concept be a way to turn 
visible and explicit the norms we are critical upon? 
Do do. The surprising thing is that under such conditions Culture Studies would continue to do 
what they have always done. Cognitive Culture Studies would look at artefacts, texts and 
institutions as means to a better understanding of the mental construction of culture. They would 
allow for identifying concepts and metaphors and for analyzing how they negotiate meaning and 
relevance. They would help to reconstruct the narrative and performative construction of reality 
and bind it back to its neural formation. They would reject any kind of oversimplification in 
which culture is reduced to the movement of arms and fingers (like in the example of string and 
piano players) or to general distinctions (like between individualistic and collectivistic cultures) 
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which either appear as mere statistical findings or never existed or tend to vanish in fluid 
modernity. They would find a permanent challenge in the question, how abstraction and 
embodiment can come together. Only then we may understand how the human as a cultural 
being is simultaneously able and resistant to change. Cognition as the embodied mind is the 
battlefield in which culture drives meaning to life. In this simple sense, Cognitive Culture 
Studies is a Life Science. 
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